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People’s Republic of China: The Case of the Tai 
Lue of Sipsong Panna 
Roger Casas 
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Development - Chiang Mai University, Thailand 
Resumen 
Este artículo ofrece una breve discusión de algunas de las contradicciones 
inherentes a las políticas lingüísticas puestas en práctica por el gobierno de 
la República Popular China (RPC) en áreas habitadas por las llamadas 
“minorías”, en teoría destinadas a preservar y promover el uso de lenguas 
no mayoritarias, a través del caso de los Tai Lue (clasificados oficialmente 
como Dai), en la provincia de Yunnan. Mientras el estado garantiza el 
derecho de todos los grupos étnicos reconocidos (minzu) en la RPC a 
utilizar y promocionar formas escritas y orales de sus lenguas, la inserción 
del Tai Lue y de otras lenguas “minoritarias” en una jerarquía simbólica 
dominada por la cultura de la mayoría Han legitima la exclusión de facto 
de dichas lenguas de los espacios públicos. 
Palabras clave 
Política lingüística, Minorías nacionales, Tai Lue, Dai, China. 
Abstract 
This paper offers a brief discussion of some of the contradictions 
informing linguistic policies implemented by the government of the 
People´s Republic of China (PRC) in “minority” areas, allegedly aimed at 
preserving and promoting non-Han languages, through the case of the Tai 
Lue (officially classified as Dai) in Yunnan province. It is argued that, 
while all (recognized) ethnic groups (minzu) in the PRC are granted the 
right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages by the 
state, the insertion of the Tai Lue and other “minority” languages within a 
symbolic hierarchy dominated by the culture of the Han majority 
legitimates their de facto exclusion from public spaces. 
Keywords 
Linguistic policy, National minorities, Tai Lue, Dai, China.
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Introduction  
In contrast with the strongly assimilationist character of the 
policies implemented during the Republic of China regarding 
the ethnic “minorities” living within the borders of the 
country,1 the leaders of the People´s Republic of China (PRC) 
made clear, even before the establishment of the new regime in 
1949, that they would grant official recognition to the different 
non-Han groups inhabiting the country.2 In terms of practical 
policy, this recognition meant, first, the consideration of all 
inhabitants in the PRC, no matter their ethnicity, as equal 
before the law –and thus equally subject to the rights and duties 
that citizenship entails; second, it involved the establishment of 
a system of “regional autonomy” implemented in those areas 
with a significant non-Han population, and aimed at providing 
                                                 
1 On ethnic policy during the Republic of China and the assimilationist 
project of the Nationalist Party, see Dreyer (1976: 15-41). The terms 
“minority”, “minorities” and “majority” are put in inverted commas in order 
to emphasize their contested use within the context of integration of ethnic 
or social groups within larger political units (usually nation-states). 
2 On the complex cultural and political reasons behind this policy, see for 
example Connor (1984: 67 ff.) and Harrell (2000: 25 ff). The term “Han” is 
the official designation of the “majority” group in the PRC, comprising 
around 90% of the total population in the country. 
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the local ethnic groups with the institutional means to remain 
“masters in their own land”.3.  
The official recognition of ethnicity within the PRC 
(acknowledged in the constitutional definition of the PRC as a 
“multiethnic and unitary state”), as well as the implementation 
of the policy of “regional autonomy”, demanded the set into 
motion of a massive ethnographic project aimed at identifying, 
classifying, preserving and developing the cultures of the ethnic 
(non-Han) minorities.4 Since the 1950s, the central and regional 
governments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have 
spent a great deal of effort in the implementation of policies 
concerning non-Han cultures, as well as in publicizing the role 
of the state in the preservation and promotion of “minority” 
cultures and languages in the PRC.5 
                                                 
3  For a description of the system of “national regional autonomy” see 
MacKerras (1994). The establishment of the “national regional” 
administration run parallel to the identification process of ethnic groups and 
the creation of the official system for ethnic categorization which ended up 
being made up of 55 “minority” groups, or, in official terminology, 
“minority nationalities” (少数民族，shaoshu minzu) plus the Han majority; 
on the identification process, see Guldin (1994) or Fei Xiaotong, “Ethnic 
Identification in China” (in ibid., Towards a People´s Anthropology, New 
World Press, Beijing, 1981), who offers the “official” point of view of a 
Chinese anthropologist. On the the meaning of the term “minzu”, usually 
translated in the PRC as “nationality”, and, more recently, as “ethnic group”, 
see Harrell (2000: 29). 
4 See the previous footnote.   
5  As stated in the 1982 Constitution, organs of self-government in the 
national autonomous areas “sort out and protect the cultural legacy of the 
nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their cultures” 
(Art. 119). 
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Regarding specifically the situation of linguistic policies, CCP 
authorities have striven to show their commitment to the 
preservation and development of non-Han written and spoken 
languages around the country. The Constitution of the PRC 
specifies that the organs of self-government in areas of limited 
autonomy “employ the spoken and written language or 
languages in common use in the locality” (Article 121). 
According to the 1984 Law on National Regional Autonomy, 
such organs “shall persuade and encourage cadres of the 
various nationalities to learn each other’s spoken and written 
languages”; furthermore, “[c]adres of Han nationality should 
learn the spoken and written languages of the local minority 
nationalities […] Awards should be given to state functionaries 
in national autonomous areas who can use skilfully two or more 
spoken or written languages that are commonly used in the 
locality” (Law on National Regional Autonomy, Article 49). 
Recently-published official “white papers” dealing with 
“minority” issues in the PRC have emphasized the continued 
commitment to this policy on the part of the government as 
well as its success: after emphasizing once more that “[a]ll 
ethnic groups in China have the freedom and right to use and 
develop their own spoken and written languages”, the 2000 
White Paper on “National Minorities Policy and its Practice in 
China” states that “the spoken and written languages of national 
minorities are widely used in judicial, 6  administrative and 
                                                 
6 The Constitution of 1982 states that legal hearings in nationality areas 
“should be conducted in the language or languages in common use in the 
locality” (Article 134). Indictments, judgements, and other legal documents 
should be written in the relevant nationality language. The Nationality Law 
of 1984 “guarantees the citizens of every nationality the right to use their 
own nationality spoken and written language in carrying out litigation” 
(Article 47). Translations should be provided for participants who do not 
know the relevant language. See MacKerras (1994: 156).  
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educational fields, as well as in political activities and social 
life … The organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous 
areas all use one or more languages of their areas when they 
perform their duties”. Reflecting the relative autonomy 
regarding educational matters in “minority” areas, the 
document states that the local governments “work out their 
local educational programs and decide on the languages to be 
used in teaching in the local schools”; furthermore, “[i]n 
schools with minority students as the main body and other 
educational institutions the languages of the ethnic groups 
concerned or languages commonly used in the locality are used 
in teaching” (Chinese Government, 2000). 
Regarding the use of non-Han language in the media, and 
always according to the government, “the Central People's 
Broadcasting Station and local broadcasting stations use 16 
minority languages, and regional, prefectural and county 
broadcasting stations or rediffusion stations use more than 20. 
As many as 3,410 feature films have been produced and 10,430 
films dubbed in minority languages” (ibid.). 
Efforts on the part of the state concerning the preservation and 
promotion of “minority” languages include the publication of 
minority language translations of Chinese books on laws as 
well as on practical subjects such as agriculture or medicine, 
textbooks for students (in some cases up to university level), as 
well as posters for classrooms, office and street signs, banners, 
etc. Considerable attention is paid to collecting and publishing 
songs, stories, and other traditional literature in the selected 
“standard” languages. 7  By 1998, 36 publishing houses 
                                                 
7 See Bradley (2005: 6): “Where it exists, writing literature is scrupulously 
collected and preserved; transcriptions and translations into Chinese are 
prepared and sometimes published, and research offices carry out various 
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specializing in publishing for national minorities had published 
more than 53 million copies of around 4,100 titles in 23 
minority languages (ibid.). Apart from this, “China publishes 
about 100 newspapers in 17 minority languages and 73 
periodicals in 11 minority languages” (ibid.). 
All this data seem to confirm the overall success of ethnic 
policies in the PRC and give proof of the ongoing concern on 
the part of the CCP for the situation of non-Han cultures in 
general, and languages in particular –at least during the post-
Cultural Revolution period. Recent state efforts at promoting 
local cultures and languages are seen as closely related to the 
“ethnic revival” and the resurgence of local cultural identities 
that has taken place in the PRC since the 1980s.8 
                                                                                                        
kinds of linguistic work, including the preparation of grammars, linguistic 
and other original research about the language, more often in Chinese but 
also written and published in the languages of some larger groups”. Bradley 
points to some kind of internal censorship during the process of publication 
of such materials but he does not elaborate on the issue. See also the white 
paper on “Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China” (Chinese 
Government, 2005): “With the assistance of the state and efforts of the 
ethnic autonomous areas, by 2003, 4,787 titles of books in ethnic minority 
languages had been published, totaling 50.34 million copies. There were 
also 205 magazines and 88 newspapers in such languages, totaling 7.81 
million copies and 131.30 million copies, respectively”.   
8 See Iredale et al. (2001: 60): “Minority nationalities began to stress the 
maintenance of their languages, cultures, institutions and relics. The state 
demonstrated its tolerance by producing book during the 1980s on the 
culture, especially the costumes, dance and traditional lifestyles, of minority 
nationalities”; also ibid., 80: “the state´s emphasis on strengthening minority 
groups languages has been notable. This is seen as one way of restoring 
some degree of cultural autonomy and winning back support that was lost 
during the Cultural Revolution”; on the alleged resurgence of ethnic 
identities since the 1980s, see also MacKerras (1994: 144, 266).  
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However, there are important factors concerning language 
policy theory and implementation which are often left out from 
such accounts and which point to a different set of realities: for 
a start, the “minority” languages preserved and promoted by the 
government are only those recognized (or created anew, in the 
case of writing systems) as standard languages for the 
recognized minzu: non-standard and unrecognized languages 
within the PRC do not fall under the policy, and due to this as 
well as to the overall expansion of Chinese language, many of 
them are today endangered. 9  Apart from these endangered 
languages, the situation regarding recognized “minority” 
languages in different areas of the PRC shows striking 
contrasts, depending on the historical conditions and present 
economic context of the specific “autonomous area”, as well as 
on political issues related to the use of particular non-Han 
languages 10  (Dwyer, 1998); in practice, issues such as Han 
migration into peripheral areas, the maintenance of traditional 
conceptions of “minority” cultures as “backward” and 
“underdeveloped” (luohou) on the part of the Han, the growing 
role played by Chinese as the only language of social mobility 
around the country, the shortage in public schools of funding 
for the implementation of training in “minority” languages, and 
the subsequent lack of political interest in preserving local 
cultural traditions, all guarantee that the teaching and use at 
official level of non-Han languages in the PRC is at best scarce, 
and that the emphasis is put on the teaching and use of standard 
Chinese –a reality officially reflected in the design and 
                                                 
9 On endangered languages in the PRC, see especially Bradley (2005), and 
the rest of articles collected in that issue of the International Journal of the 
Sociology of Language.  
10 As Iredale et al. remark, “[w]hile national minority languages have been 
strengthened, national minority literature is still strictly censored” (2001: 65).  
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publication in 2000 of the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language. 
This context of course affects the situation of languages of 
different non-Han groups in different ways, but in any case it 
all points to a stark contradiction between official goals and 
discourse, on one side, and policy implementation and local 
realities regarding the preservation and promotion of non-Han 
languages, on the other. 
This paper deals with the contemporary situation of one 
particular “minority” language, the Tai Lue, spoken by an 
ethnic group included together with other Tai-speaking groups 
within the category “Daizu” and inhabiting mainly the Dai 
Autonomous Prefecture of Xishuangbanna (XDAP), in 
southern Yunnan province. Basically, it will be argued that 
several issues related to state nation-building and 
developmental goals constrain the “preservation and 
development” of Lue language and script; while it is not 
implied that the situation of Lue represents in any way that of 
other “minority” languages, I believe that the study of this 
particular language within the context of current social, 
political, and educational trends in Sipsong Panna may shed 
light upon the situation of other non-Han languages in the PRC. 
In short, it is not my goal to imply that Lue language is 
“endangered”, but to point to some of the problems inherent to 
linguistic policies in the PRC and Sipsong Panna and their 
relation to local socio-political issues. 
The paper starts with a brief presentation of Lue written and 
spoken languages and a short history of Chinese education in 
Sipsong Panna –including the development of a new Tai script 
after the establishment of PRC administration in Sipsong Panna 
in 1953; this is followed by an account of the ongoing conflict 
between the state education system and monastic education, as 
well as of some of the factors behind it and its connections with 
8 Roger Casas 
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contemporary struggles over the construction of Lue identity. 
The last part of the article will draw some conclusions 
regarding language policy and the cultural and social situation 
of the non-Han “minorities” in Sipsong Panna.  
Lue vs. Chinese language in Sipsong Panna 
The Tai Lue of Sipsong Panna. 11  in Yunnan Province, are 
arguably one of the “minority” groups within the PRC that have 
received more attention from scholars during the last few years. 
The importance that Xishuangbanna has attained as one of the 
main tourist destinations in Yunnan since the middle 1980s plays 
an important part in this interest towards the area and the changes 
it is experiencing as part of its inclusion in the national and 
regional trade markets.12  
Lue language is one of the several different Tai dialects spoken in 
the upper Mekong region. In China, Lue is classified within the 
Tai (known in China as 壮，Zhuang) family. 13  Lue is closely 
                                                 
11 I prefer to use the term Lue to name the group (sometimes spelt “Lü” or 
“Lüe” in scholarly works), for, as noted, the official category “Daizu” (傣族) 
or “Dai” includes several ethnic Tai peoples who are not (they would not 
consider themselves to be) Lue. The Lue make approximately for one third of 
the total population of the Daizu, adding up to around 280-300.000 members, 
and constituting the most important of Sipsong Panna ´s ethnic groups 
numerically, totaling around 35% of the total population of the prefecture. See 
Hansen (1999: 88). In this paper the terms “Tai” and “Lue” are used 
interchangeably when referring to the Sipsong Panna context.  
12 See Hansen 2004. 
13 Most of the dialects within the southern branch of the Tai family are 
classified as part of the Daizu category, and many of them are mutually 
unintelligible –see Keyes 1992: 21. The relation of the Tai-Kadai languages 
to the Sino-Tibetan linguistic family is disputed. Although traditionally 
linguists tended to group the Tai-Kadai family together with other families 
within the Sino-Tibetan family, at present this opinion is considered 
problematic even by Chinese specialists –see for instance Chen Baoya and 
Linguistic Policy and “Minority” Languages in the PRC  9 
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related to other Tai languages spoken in eastern Myanmar-Burma 
(Tai Khuen in the Shan State), northern Thailand (Tai Yuan) and 
northern Laos. Apart from the Lue population in Sipsong Panna, 
several Lue communities in Thailand, Burma and Laos continue 
using Lue language in spite of the standardization of education 
systems and national languages in all such states. Lue language is 
thus arguably not endangered, and it is still the main means of 
daily communication for Lue communities in Sipsong Panna –
especially in the countryside where the presence of Han migrants 
is less important than it is in the towns. 
A traditional writing system, basically serving as a religious script, 
is still widely used in the temples in Sipsong Panna; this script is 
practically identical to the one still used in monasteries in 
Kengtung (Chiengtung), in present day Shan State, in turn closely 
related to the traditional script of the Tai Yuan of northern 
Thailand. The Tham script14 was presumably brought into Sipsong 
Panna from Kengtung together with Theravada Buddhist texts by 
members of the Suondok and Padaeng sects, coming in turn from 
Chiang Mai, then the capital of the confederation of states known 
as Lan Na, in northern Thailand, between the thirteenth and 
fifteenth centuries AD.15 
                                                                                                        
He Fang, “A Preliminary Study of the Basic Pedigree Structure of the Sino-
Tibetan Language Family”, in the Journal of Yunnan University for the 
Nationalities (云南民族大学学报, Yunnan Minzu Daxue Xuebao), Social 
Sciences Edition (哲学社会学版, Zhexue Shehuixue Ban), Vol. 21, No. 1, 
January 2004. See also Keyes (1992: 6 ff.).  
14 So designated by scholar Hans Penth “since it was first used primarily as a 
vehicle to convey the teachings of Buddhism in a form more accessible to 
Tai speaking peoples” (Keyes, 1995: 140).  
15 “The Yuan script was brought to Kengtung by the Yuan people of Lan Na 
in the thirteenth century when they moved into that area … The Hkun 
[Kheun] area of Kengtung was culturally, racially and politically under the 
10 Roger Casas 
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Prior to the establishment of a firm Chinese administration in 
the region and the large-scale arrival of Han migrants in the 
area, Lue was the dominant language and lingua franca in the 
interethnic “symbiotic context” (Hsieh,1989: 52) of pre-modern 
Sipsong Panna –although its use and learning was arguably not 
imposed to the rest of groups interacting with the Lue.16 This 
                                                                                                        
influence of Lan Na until the mid-sixteenth century. The Hkun script … is 
no doubt Yuan, and it is still very much a Yuan script” (Mong, 2004: 171 
ff.); see also Mangrai (2002: 3 ff.): “Within the five above-mentioned states 
where Khün [Kheun] script was in general use [Kengtung, Muang Laem, 
Sipsong Panna, Laos and Chiang Mai], there seems to be little doubt that 
their culture and the Sasana [Buddhist religion] came from Chiang Mai, in 
the south, as recorded in the Padaeng chronicle”. This script was also (and 
still is) used by the Bulang, a Mon-Khmer group related to the  Lawa/ Lua 
of northern Thailand and inhabiting the highlands of western Sipsong Panna, 
practicing Theravada Buddhism as well; on the relations between the 
Bulang and the Lue, see Hsieh (1989: 52 ff.): On the Tai scripts and the 
Tham, see Keyes (1995: 139 ff.): For a discussion of the concept of the Tai-
speaking groups using the Tham script as an “imagined community”, see 
ibid., 141, 145 ff.  
16 On the relations between lowland and upland groups within Tai polities 
and the concept of “muang”, see George Condominas, From Lawa to Mon, 
from Saa´ to Thai. Historical and Anthropological Aspects of Southeast 
Asian Social Spaces (Australian National University, Canberra, 1990) and 
the collection of articles edited by Andrew Turton, Civility and Savagery. 
Social Identity in Tai States (Curzon, Richmond, 2000). Borchert (2008: 
116) relates (mistakenly in my opinion) political de-centralization and 
dialectal diversity during this period; according to him, “the relative 
weakness of the cao phaendin [the king of Sipsong Panna] … is reflected 
even today in the widespread view that there is no standard version of the 
Dai-lue language. Although what is spoken throughout the region is 
essentially mutually intelligible, pronunciations, tones and words vary 
widely”. Standardization of written and spoken languages and the 
consequent trend towards monolinguism are related to the spread of a 
universal educational system, phenomena arguably associated in turn with 
the birth of the modern nation-state; in pre-modern Sipsong Panna there was 
no need for the imposition of linguistic uniformity among the Lue, not to 
Linguistic Policy and “Minority” Languages in the PRC  11 
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situation was altered by the gradual incorporation of Sipsong 
Panna into Chinese administrative structures during the 
formative period of the Chinese “geo-body”:17 in 1895 Sipsong 
Panna was formally included within the borders of the Chinese 
Empire through the agreements signed by representatives of the 
Empire and of the British and French governments which 
conformed the present mapping out of the borders regions 
between China, British Burma, French Indochina and Siam.18 
At that time (end of the nineteenth and beginnings of the 
twentieth century), knowledge of written and spoken Chinese 
was almost inexistent among the different non-Chinese 
populations inhabiting Sipsong Panna. Unlike in other 
peripheral regions of the Empire, such as Lijiang, Confucian 
education was never really popular in Sipsong Panna; 
according to Hansen, there were only two private Confucian 
schools in Mengla (a township in eastern Sipsong Panna) by the 
end of the Qing empire, and only some members of the ruling 
chao19 understood and spoke Chinese (1999: 93-94). This lack 
of knowledge of Chinese language on the part of the local non-
Chinese population was regarded as a major obstacle for the 
imposition of Chinese rule early on, and already in 1912, just 
                                                                                                        
speak of the imposition of Lue language and script upon the rest of 
subordinate non-Tai groups in Sipsong Panna; on these issues see for 
instance Guo Yingjie, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China. The 
Search for National Identity under Reform (Routledge, London and New 
York, 2004), esp. pp. 93 ff..  
17 The concept of “geo-body” was firstly used by Tongchai Winichakul and 
applied to the case of Thailand in his Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-
body of a Nation (Univ. of Hawaii Pr., Honolulu, 1994).  
18 Keyes (1992: 11-12); see also Tongchai, Siam Mapped.  
19 The chao were the ruling class of landowners in Lue (and other Tai-
speaking groups) traditional society; see Hsieh (1989: 106 ff.).  
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after the demise of the Empire, the head of the Chinese 
government of Simao and Puer reported to the provincial 
government on the urgent need for developing Chinese 
education in Sipsong Panna (ibid., 94). Subsequently, the 
Nationalist government set up then the first Chinese schools in 
the area (intended for both locals and Chinese immigrants) at 
the same time that the new administrative division of the area 
was established. Through “the teaching of Chinese, the 
government hoped to break the authority of the chao class and 
the influential Buddhist monks who conducted all education of 
Tai boys in the monasteries” (ibid., 93-94).20 As we shall see, 
problems related to the importance of monastic education 
among the Lue have continued until today. 
In 1921, guidelines for expanding “border education” were set 
by the central Nationalist government, and a quota system was 
established to get boys into state schools. 21  However, the 
attempt to establish state education as an alternative to temple 
education in Sipsong Panna failed: most schools were not open 
                                                 
20 How goals of nation-building were entangled at the time with traditional 
conceptions of Chinese cultural superiority is reflected for instance in article 
7 of the “13 Principles of Governing the Frontier” elaborated in 1913 by He 
Shukun, the first Nationalist chief of government in Sipsong Panna: “The 
barbarians don’t know the Han language, so we must first emphasize 
education … Children of the barbarian officials should all enter into schools. 
We will teach them speaking first, then simple characters, then more 
complicated sentences, so on and so forth … They cannot follow the old 
custom of sending children to the temples to be monks and to learn Burmese 
books only. If they don’t know the Han language, they will face much 
difficulty in their work” (translated in Hsieh, 1989: 157-158).  
21 According to this system, each medium-size village was forced to send at 
least one boy to the nearest Chinese school. Facing this new regulation, 
local villagers started paying poor Tai, Akha or Han to attend the schools 
instead their own children. See Hansen (1999: 95-96).  
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in the lowlands but higher up in the mountains in order to avoid 
malaria, and the Tai students did not get the preferential 
treatment they thought they were entitled to according to their 
traditional dominant position in the social hierarchy of the 
region; to these reasons one might add the deeply ingrained 
mistrust towards the Han Chinese on the part of the local Tai, 
and the lack of overall support from the royal family for the 
universalization of Chinese education in the area: in fact only 
the royal family and the families of officials in the local 
government and the palace in Jinghong (the traditional seat of 
the highest religious and political authorities in Sipsong Panna) 
sent their children to Chinese schools. Most students in the new 
schools were Han, and when finally in 1942 all schooling 
stopped in Sipsong Panna due to Japanese bombing in the area, 
the Nationalist project of establishing Chinese schools and 
expanding the use of Chinese language in this border area had 
failed (ibid., 95-96). 
A contested tradition: the “new Tai script” 
The creation of a new administration under CCP rule (the 
Xishuangbanna autonomous “region”, later “prefecture”, was 
created in 1953) involved a renovated effort towards the 
establishment of Chinese education in Sipsong Panna and the 
expansion of Chinese language in the area. According to 
Hansen (1999: 100), in the first years of the PRC the old Tai 
script was used as a means of teaching in public schools.22 
                                                 
22 Hansen mentions that a few village schools experimented with teaching 
one class of Tai students in Chinese only and teaching basic Tai in another 
before turning to the study of Chinese; the teachers she interviewed all agree 
that the students in the Tai class performed better in school (1999: 99). On 
the other hand, some of the teaching materials from that period were also 
used when the use of the “new Tai” script was abandoned for the old one, at 
the beginning of the 1990s –see below.  
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However, in spite of these early attempts, soon the local 
government began conducting work aimed at reforming the 
existing Lue script. In the framework of a wider, national-level 
project aimed at reforming and standardizing existing scripts 
(and creating new ones), in 1952 a team sent by the Academy 
of Social Sciences and directed by linguist Fu Maoji arrived in 
Sipsong Panna to conduct research and prepare the reform of 
the traditional Lue script. 23  In 1953, the Second People´s 
Congress of Xishuangbanna approved the reform the traditional 
script, and a local “Committee for the Reform of the Dai 
Script”, composed of seven members, was formed (Hsieh, 
1989: 244). Guldin has described how the process of 
standardizing non-Han languages at a national level involved 
the cooperation of members of the “national minorities”;24 as 
Hansen has pointed out, in Sipsong Panna this process involved 
the collaboration of a few local Tai who apart from being 
proficient in the old script knew Chinese well (1999: 100), 
including the last ruler (the chao phaendin) of Sipsong Panna, 
who acted as an advisor and assistant to Prof. Fu (Hsieh, 1989: 
244). The reform and put into use of the new script was ratified 
by a national-level commission in 1955. 
                                                 
23 On the role of Fu Maoji in this project at a national level, see Guldin 
1994. According to this author, the main phase of the project took place at 
the middle 1950s, when around 700 trained specialists were sent into 
minority areas in 14 different provinces to conduct research on 42 languages 
(Guldin, 1994: 133). The process began earlier in Sipsong Panna probably 
due to the existence of a script with an old tradition among the Lue.   
24 Due to this, “[s]ome ethnologists felt that their work had indeed helped 
include the minorities in the Liberation” (Guldin, 1994:134).  
Linguistic Policy and “Minority” Languages in the PRC  15 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº 19/2011 
Several dictionaries and teaching materials in the “new Tai” (新
傣文) were then produced,25 and the script became the standard 
for official use and bilingual education among the Lue. Apart 
from a hiatus between 1987 and 1996, when the old script was 
again recovered for official use, 26 , and of course from the 
periods when use of minority languages and scripts was banned 
(especially during the Cultural Revolution, see Hansen, 1999: 
106), the “new Tai” has been the Tai script officially in use in 
the XDAP; therefore, two scripts, apart from Chinese, are at 
present in use in Sipsong Panna: while the old script is still 
studied by novices and monks in the local temples, the new 
script is used in official documents and signs or within the state 
education system –although to a very limited extent, as we will 
see now. 
Conflicting education systems 
Soon after the establishment of the XDAP, the Land Reform 
and subsequent political movements in the PRC inaugurated an 
era of repression of Buddhist practices in the area: from the end 
1950s to the end of the 1970s, and especially during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), temples and other religious 
sites in Sipsong Panna were destroyed or damaged, monks and 
                                                 
25 In 1957 publication of the Banna Newspaper (using the new script) started. 
Publication was suspended from 1966 up to 1972 (Hansen 1999: 100).  
26 Hansen (1999: 100, 126); see also Hsieh (1989: 244): “in 1987, after the 
new writing system had been used for 32 years, the People´s Congress of 
Xishuangbanna passed a resolution to decide to resume the old style of Dai 
character. Apparently this was so because of the support for the old script on 
the part of the last chao phaendin”. Hsieh interpreted this as a symbol of “a 
resurgence of traditional Dai identity” (ibid., 244-5, 247). Keyes comments 
that the new script is not popular among the Lue in Sipsong Panna (1995: 
142); however, local attitudes towards it seem to be mixed; for a more 
detailed account see Hansen (1999: 109 ff.).   
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novices forced to disrobe or flee to neighbouring countries, and 
Buddhist practice in the area was totally disrupted. 27  As 
mentioned, teaching and use of Lue script (traditional or new) 
was banned during this period. After the changes at the top of 
the CCP between 1976 and 1978, religious freedom was 
officially re-established in the PRC by the 1982 Constitution, 
and a strong recovery of Buddhist practice took place in 
Sipsong Panna: soon after the locals realized there was no 
danger in having their boys ordained in the local Buddhist 
temples once again, figures of novices and monks reached pre-
1957 numbers. 
However, the return of Lue boys to the temples created 
immediately a problem for the local government and its goal of 
expanding state education and Chinese language: most Lue boys 
preferred to become novices in the local temples than to enter 
public schools, and the number of Tai girls in schools was far 
greater than that of boys (Hansen, 2004: 65). Cooperation between 
local monasteries and the public system of education seemed to be 
the logical solution to this problem. However, while in the 1980s 
and 1990s there were some attempts to establish special classes 
for novices, combining Buddhist and public curricula, they were 
abandoned after a few years, and it can be argued that in general 
there has been little cooperation between the Buddhist authorities 
and the state education system (ibid.).28 
                                                 
27 See Hsieh (1989: 210 ff.).   
28 An exception to this may be the recent recognition on the part of the state 
of the Buddhist courses imparted at the main temples in Sipsong Panna, Wat 
Bajie and the new Wat Long, granted only after the temples accepted having 
Chinese teachers from the local Technical Institute (技术学院，Jishu 
Xueyuan) in Jinghong teach part of the curriculum.  
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Although according to law primary and secondary schools in 
Sipsong Panna may offer class in Tai Lue, in reality this seldom 
happens: the main reasons for this are the poor financial 
situation of many schools,29 the shortage of Tai teachers versed 
on the Tai script (Hansen, 1999: 125), and, importantly, 
disagreement within the government and among school 
administrators on the need for and utility of Tai lessons. As 
Hansen notes, “teachers, school administrators and members of 
the Bureau of Education in the three counties and the prefecture 
[are] roughly divided between a majority who saw the teaching 
of Tai as a temporary necessity, and a minority who wanted 
expansion and improvement of Tai language instruction in 
primary schools, in examination, and in secondary education” 
(ibid., 129). Due in part to such disagreements, interesting 
experiments on bilingual education started in the 1980s were 
abandoned in the 1990s (ibid., 127; see also Hansen, 2004: 67). 
The return to the use of the old Tai script at the official level 
between 1987 and 1996 created more confusion and evidenced 
the internal divisions in the government regarding education in 
Tai and the inconsistency of educational policies. 
The argument on the part of the government officials who see 
no need to expand teaching of local languages in public schools 
is that the use of such languages represents a hindrance to attain 
proficiency in Chinese, the only language of social mobility in 
contemporary Sipsong Panna. The majority sees thus the 
teaching of Tai as a temporary necessity at best, with the goal 
of facilitating the gradual disappearance of the language, 
                                                 
29 The de-centralization brought in 1985 by the national-level reform of the 
educational structure meant that the financing of schools was increasingly 
dependent on locally generated revenue. This has meant in practice a 
general deterioration of education in border areas due to a general decline of 
local government’s financial capacities. See Iredale et al. (2001: 67-68).  
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considered as an obstacle for the economic and social 
development on the part of the Tai (Hansen, 1999: 129, 131). 
This view is closely related to the consideration of Chinese as 
the language of science and modernity, and as a superior way 
of communication –and the correlative representation of 
minority cultures and languages as “backward”.30 
The new socio-economic and political contexts in Sipsong Panna 
(and as it happens for many other minority areas) determines 
today the importance of Chinese language as a means of 
communication in the region. Since the early 1980s and especially 
in the 1990s, the development of tourism and trade in Sipsong 
Panna has attracted large numbers of individual migrants coming 
from populated areas mainly in the East of the country (such as 
Hunan or Jiangxi, but also from Sichuan and other provinces) who 
either have been recruited by private enterprises or have decided 
on their own initiative to try their luck in the developing border 
regions (Hansen, 2004: 60). Chinese has thus become the main 
                                                 
30  As Dwyer puts it, “Mandarin, canonized as the standard language of 
China, stands at the pinnacle of a metalinguistic hierarchy which mirrors the 
vertical basis of power in China today” (1998: 68). See also Bilik: “We are 
up against a metaphor which considers Chinese to be the vehicle of high 
intelligence, and it reminds us of the imagined historical past when Chinese 
civilization was supposed to be superior to the cultures of its neighbours, 
ranking as highest in the world in literature, ethics, technology, and 
magnificent cities and palaces” (1998: 50). This linguistic hegemony of 
Chinese is also reflected in the local media in Sipsong Panna: in spite of the 
data presented in the introduction regarding the employ of  “minority” 
languages in the media, such use is extremely limited in Sispong Panna. 
This is especially apparent in both the two prefectural and the city Jinghong 
television channels, which limit programs in Lue and other non-Han local 
languages to a few minutes every week. On the other hand, all inhabitants in 
the XDAP have access to dozens of regional channels from within the PRC 
and emitting in Chinese, while access to foreign channels (including those 
from Thailand) is restricted.  
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language in use in the educational system, the administration, and 
trade in Sipsong Panna.31 
Within this context, the possibility offered by law for the 
offspring of local ethnic “minorities” to be educated in their own 
mother tongues is constricted precisely by what Walker Connor 
has called the “voluntary principle”: faced with the choice of 
sending their boys to the temple in order to get an education in 
Lue, or to the Chinese school, parents will normally decide for 
the latter option. As Connor stated in relation to the situation in 
the Soviet Union, “[p]arents desirous of eliminating any barriers 
to the upward mobility of their children would be apt to select 
the school that assured their offspring the best grounding in the 
country’s language of success, that is to say, the language of 
access to the higher echelons of the party, industry, and 
government” (Connor, 1984: 257). 
This reasoning may also be applied to the limited learning of 
Tai in state schools, for in view of this situation many Tai 
parents will expectedly not favour the introduction of Tai 
teaching in the schools: the symbolic association of Chinese 
language with modernity, and the arrival in Sipsong Panna of 
new patterns of consumption –and consumerism, together with 
the dominant presence of Chinese language in the national and 
local media, administration and educative system, explains that 
for many families, especially within the urban milieu of 
Sipsong Panna, the solution to the disjunction between the 
languages used at home and in school is solved not only by 
taking their offspring into state schools, but even by 
                                                 
31 See also Dwyer: “The population transfer and migration of Han Chinese 
from eastern China to the peripheral regions has firmly established the 
national standard, Mandarin Chinese, as the primary language of 
government, scholarship and, to some extent, commerce” (1998: 70).  
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abandoning the use of Lue language at home, in order to 
facilitate the learning of Chinese on the part of children. 
Reflecting this attitude, even those (generally Tai) officials 
willing to expand education in Tai are convinced of the 
necessity and benefit of learning Chinese language and Han 
culture, and therefore bilingual education is generally 
understood at best as “transitional”, that is, a tool to accelerate 
the immersion of Lue children in Chinese language and 
culture.32 In the context of this (ongoing) conflict between state 
and monastic education, thus, the main aim of using spoken Tai 
and the (new) Tai script in schools seems to be not the 
facilitation of learning in itself (by means of providing with an 
allegedly more simple tool for the teaching of the local 
language), but to facilitate the integration of Lue boys into the 
state educational system, while at the same time annulling the 
temple as the main institution for cultural transmission and 
depriving local monks of their traditional symbolic and social 
power, thus weakening the potential of traditional Tai culture as 
a counter-ideology regarding state nation-building and 
developmental goals in Sipsong Panna.33 
                                                 
32 A new pilot project concerning bilingual education is at present being 
implemented in Sipsong Panna by the local Bureau of Education, with 
technical and financial assistance by the organization SIL International. The 
project, carried out in five selected village schools in Sipsong Panna with a 
majority of Lue students, aims at establishing comprehensive Tai language 
teaching from the first year of primary school. However, the percentage of 
Tai teaching is progressively reduced every year while that of using Chinese 
language within the class is increased –so the project belongs also under the 
“transitional bilingual education” category. Newly produced teaching 
materials are printed using the “new Tai” script.  
33 On these issues, see Hansen 1999 (passim), and 2004: 64 ff. See also 
Keyes (1992: 26) on Buddhist monasteries in Sipsong Panna as a source of 
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In spite of these reasons (or precisely because of them), 
teaching and use of Tai written and spoken languages is 
practically absent from public schools, the media and the 
administration in Sipsong Panna.34 
Conclusions 
In order to summarize while at the same time expanding on 
some of the ideas presented so far, I would like to emphasize 
two important points in relation to linguistic policies in the 
PRC in general and in Sipsong Panna in particular: the first is 
that goals of nation-building and economic development 
continue apparently to determine official attitudes and policies 
regarding minority languages in the country. From the point of 
view of the state, multiculturalism and multi-linguism may 
become an obstacle to attain goals of national unity and 
economic development, and while “minority” cultures and 
languages need not to be totally erased in order to reach such 
goals, generally the use and teaching of a single common lingua 
franca as a means of communication at the national level is 
emphasized.35 Furthermore, within the PRC, social and cultural 
                                                                                                        
“significant passive resistance” to state policies; and Hsieh (1989: 247) on 
the importance of the old script as a marker of traditional Lue identity.  
34 See Hsieh (1989: 245): “As a matter of fact, neither the traditional style 
nor the new style had much use in Sipsong Panna after liberation [in the 
case of Sipsong Panna the date should be 1950]… On the one hand, the 
number of teachers who new the new Dai characters was still not adequate; 
on the other hand, school education concentrated on learning the Han 
language (Chinese)”. Even though Hsieh wrote this at the end of the 1980s, 
his conclusions are valid to describe the situation in Sipsong Panna today.   
35  On these ideas, see for example Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, 
London, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell Univ. Pr., 
1983), Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, 
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conditions such as immigration of Han Chinese into previously 
“minority”-dominated areas or the subordinate position of 
“minority” languages in the “metalinguistic hierarchy” within 
the country guarantee that their use is more and more confined 
to the context of the family, making sure that all citizens are 
able to speak the standard (Chinese) and understand state 
messages. On the other hand, in the case of Sipsong Panna the 
creation of the “new Tai script” in the 1950s involved the 
attempt to isolate the Lue from culturally-related groups using 
the same script but living outside the PRC, a step in the process 
of erasure of traditional Lue identity and creation of a 
specifically Chinese minzu (that is, the “Dai”). 
A second point I want to emphasize, related to the first, is that the 
implementation of special linguistic policies regarding “minority” 
languages more often than not help reproduce not only traditional 
cultural prejudices on the part of the Han majority (and very often 
of members of the “minorities” themselves) but, most importantly, 
the subordinate socioeconomic position of non-Han groups in the 
“autonomous areas”.  
As has been shown in this paper, since the times of the 
Republic of China the integration of Tai children (particularly 
boys) within the state educational system has been problematic. 
The failure of Tai boys in school is all the more evident since 
children of other ethnic groups in the region do succeed in their 
adaptation to the state education system: members of other non-
Han groups in Sipsong Panna such as the Akha (classified in 
the PRC as Hani) or the Jinuo, who, unlike the Tai, did not 
posses a script, and are therefore not entitled to receive 
                                                                                                        
Myth, Reality (Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1991); Ralph Grillo, Pluralism and the 
Politics of Difference: State, Culture and Ethnicity in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford Univ. Pr., Oxford and New York, 1998).  
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instruction in their own language, do far better than the Tai in 
school. In the eyes of many local teachers and officials, the fact 
that the non-Tai groups in Sipsong Panna lack a written 
tradition –and therefore a culture worth of praise– is the reason 
why they are more willing than the Tai to abandon their own 
cultural practices and adapt to the Chinese school system 
(Hansen, 2004: 67; ibid. 1999: 125; 155-156) –according to 
local officials, thus, the Tai risk becoming even more backward 
than the groups living in the uplands.36  
For the non-Tai groups in Sipsong Panna the public school 
system may offer an opportunity for cultural vindication 
regarding their traditional subordinate status, but in any case 
they, no less than the Tai, must assimilate to Han culture as 
much as possible in order to succeed in school. Consequently, 
educational failure on the part of the Tai and other non-Han 
groups in adapting to a system which transmits cultural values 
basically alien to them is thus often interpreted as proof of the 
inherent “backward” character of their culture (including 
language), and of the superiority of Han culture and language. 
The logic response to this understanding of the problem as a 
matter of , by which such groups are forced to adapt to a model 
in which nevertheless it is impossible to succeed as long as they 
are part of the “minorities”“cultural deprivation” of the part of 
                                                 
36 Hansen 1999: 168: “It appears that, due to their historically low position of 
the non-Tai in Sipsong Panna, some minorities from the mountains find in 
Chinese education a way to refute the prejudice against them that is still 
prevalent among Tai students and peasants […] [A] local, historically 
inherited ethnic hierarchy can play an important role in determining responses 
to state education, and some groups apparently see assimilation as a strategy 
for changing their own position within the local community, government, and 
administration”. On the importance of the Chinese concept of “culture” (文化, 
wenhua) and its relation to literacy, see Iredale et al. (2001: 52). 
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the non-Han groups37 is thus to increase education in Chinese 
language, while reducing the relevance of Tai and other 
languages in school and outside of it. In this sense, the 
educational system, in conjunction with cultural discrimination, 
which includes linguistic policy (it is irrelevant here whether 
such discrimination is positive or negative), serves to the 
reproduction and legitimacy of the system and to the 
maintenance of the subordinate position of the non-Han 
“minorities” vis-à-vis the Han majority, through the symbolic 
production of “backwardness” and of a veritable “structure of 
permanent deferral” regarding non-Han groups,38 by which such 
groups are forced to adapt to a model in which nevertheless it is 
impossible to succeed as long as they are part of the “minorities”.39 
                                                 
37 The term is taken from the study on sociolinguistics by Labov (1972).  
38  This term has been used by Gary Wilder to refer to the symbolic 
domination of Western colonial powers on the colonized –and quoted in Li 
(2007: 15). As Hansen (1999: XV) points out, “[i]n many respects Chinese 
education in Sipsong Panna resembles the education established by colonial 
powers for indigenous peoples in other parts of the world” (see also ibid., 
165). The fact that the symbolic and material subordination of non-Han 
groups may take place as an “unintended consequence” of “minority” 
policies is irrelevant for the argument displayed here: I admit the effects of 
such policies may work in the same way that the effects of the “development 
apparatus” in Lesotho described by James Ferguson, that is, “behind the 
backs or against the wills of even the most powerful actors”; in any case this 
does not affect my argument. As Ferguson, I believe that “the outcomes of 
planned social interventions can end up coming together into powerful 
constellations of control that were never intended and in some cases never 
even recognized, but are all the more effective for being ‘subjectless’”. 
Ferguson (1994: 18-19). 
39 In spite of looking at linguistic choice exclusively from the point of view 
of the social situation and the opportunities for mobility in contemporary 
Sipsong Panna, I believe this issue cannot be grasped adequately by an 
exclusively interpretive approach –it is necessary to account for both 
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